Especially after the global financial crisis, which led to a sovereign debt crisis in the European market and the adoption of austerity measures to cut government fiscal stimulus spending, tensions within the EU increased due to unalignment of interests and lack of trust and solidarity between member states, showing the high vulnerability of the EU integration project. The absence of a common response to China’s BRI is mainly due to the internal fragility of the EU. Indeed, despite the fact that the Chinese project proposes to establish win-win relationships based on friendship and mutual trust, some EU countries are increasingly concerned about the environment and human rights standards, transparency, open procurement and debt sustainability, especially when involving strategic national infrastructure. At the same time, China is considered “a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance” (European Commission 2019, a). This strategy also reinforced the EU’s perception of China’s multifaceted role. The lack of a common EU strategy partially explains China’s unclear and fragmented diplomatic approach in dealing with EU member states, especially with the fragile economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), diminishing the authority of EU institutions. Several member states, like Italy and Greece, are already partnering with China through bilateral Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) or other bilateral and multilateral initiatives, while other EU countries such as France and Germany remain mainly skeptical. Indeed, there are mixed feelings about the BRI in Europe (Brattberg & Soula 2018). However, promising potential for cooperation is repeatedly undermined by major political differences (Farnell & Crookes 2016), and EU member states failed to adopt a common response to the Chinese initiative. In the past two decades, China and the European Union, two of the three largest economies in the world and major trading partners, increasingly tightened their economic and political relations. Considering that the European market is the key strategic destination for the BRI, the Chinese project and a new manifestation of China’s soft power have been perceived as a threat to a global order shaped by the US’ hegemony.
Indeed, BRI-participating economies represent more than one-third of global GDP, and over half of the world’s population (OECD 2017).įrom the perspective of the Western world, the BRI has been the most highly debated, heavily criticized and poorly understood policy framework of the 21st century. In this context, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) - a massive infrastructure project to improve connectivity between the East and the West, increase regional cooperation and facilitate trade and investments - has been described as China’s grand strategy championing its global governance ambitions.
Indeed, under the iconic leadership of President Xi Jinping, China is adopting an increasingly assertive international behavior, balancing the need to protect its sovereignty and strategic interests related to economic and security issues, and the ambition to restore its role of a great power. After a century of humiliation imposed by Western and Japanese colonial powers, today the country is demonstrating a strong desire to achieve its national rejuvenation ( guojia fuxing).
During the last four decades, China experienced impressive economic growth, becoming one of the leading powers of the global economy.
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